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OPINION 
oPEN FoRuM S" Chm(\\cJe_. 
' . . ~-ll{-0~ 
Bush the elder-knew 
not to invade Iraq 
JBBOMB DBLAY I Aaociabld ,_ 
Regime change: The first President Bush warned that toppling Saddani Hussein (represented in this photo taken 
a year ago of U.S. soldiers and Iraqis destroying a statue of the dictator) would be more involved than the United 
States and its international coalition· could tolerate. 
By Eugene A. Brodsky 
The consequences Of President Bush,s decisipn to pre-em~ ly invade Iraq have placed the 
United States in a difficult and wJner-
ableposition.Had.Bush-followedhisfa-
ther's reasoning at ·the end of Desert 
Storm,hewouldnotbaveledtbiscoun-
b'y into the WOISci:ring Iraqi" quagmire. 
In "A World Transformed," coau-
thored by former President George R 
W. Bushandhisnationalsecurity advis-
er, Brent Scowcroft, and published by 
AlfredA Knopf in 1998, the basis for the 
US policy not to invade and occupy 
Iraq after the Iraqi army retreated from 
Kuwait is explained in detail Bush and 
Scowcroft wrote that had the decision 
been made to pursue the retreating 
Iraqi army to Baghdad, the United 
States "would have been forced to oc-
cupy Bagbdad and, in effect, rule Iraq." 
This, they. point out, would have col-
lapsed the coalition and caused 'the Ar-
ab members to desert the coalition in 
"anger." The author's impression was 
that under those circmnstanres, "there 
was no Wible 'exit strategy' ..• violat-
ing another of our principles.,. . 
Bush and Scowcroft also explained 
that the United States had been trying 
to "set a pattern for handling aggres-
sioninthepost-ColdWarworldGoing 
in and occupying Iraq, thus unilateral-
ly exceeding the United Nations man-
date, would have destroyed the prece-
dent of international response to ag-
gression that we hoped to establish." . 
Furthermore "[bad] we gone the inva-
sion route, the United States could con-
, ceivably still be an occupying power in 
a bitterly hostile land It would have 
been a dramaticallv different - and 
perhaps barren- outcome., 
Our problems in Iraq include rising 
casualties of both US and Iraqi forces 
IQld civilians, escalating federal expen-
ditures involving billions of dollars, 
long..tenn presence of pur Armed 
Forcesandgrowinghatredofthe Uilit- . 
ed States by many Iraqi people and the 
Islamic world This is the unfortunate 
product of the administratian,s deci-
sion to proceed with regime change, 
which was based on whatever rationale 
could be sold to the American people. 
Former President Bush has said lit-
tle, if anything, ~cerning his view of 
Iraqi policy, notwithstanding his de-
tailed comments in his 1998 book. 
Scowcroft, however, a faxmer national 
security adviser under Presidents Ford, 
Carter and Bush, did not hesjtate to 
state his Strong opposition to the ad-
ministratiolis Iraq policy prior to the 
invasion. In an article he submitted to 
the Wall Street Journal on Aug. 15, 
2002, Scowcroft argued that an ·inva-
sion of Iraq "was certain to divert us for 
some indefinite periOd from our war . 
on terrorism. W~ there is a virtual · 
consensus in the world against an at-
tack." Invasion of 1raq would require 
tlui U~ States "to pursue a virtual 
go-it-alone strategy against Iraq, mak-
ing any mmtary operations corre-
spondingly inore difficult and expen-
'sive ... [and]verylikelywouldhaveto 
be followed by a large«ale, long-term 
J;ni1itary occupation." Such actions 
would result in a "degradation" of in-
ternational coo_peration, and an "ex-
plosion of oumme againstus" especial-
ly in the M:uslim world Such a policy 
"could even swell thee ranks of terror-
ists." ' 
The SJ)eCific advice that George W. 
Bush's national security adviser, Con-
doleezza Rice, imparted to him.about 
invading Iraq is not public lmowledge. 
Her interview with Ed Bradley on "60 
Minutes," however, does strongly sug-
gest that her views were in agreement 
with the pro-war sentiments of the De-
partment of Defense and VJCe Presi-
dent Dick Cheney's office. In response 
to questions on Iraq, she stated that 
"Iraq is a big reason, or was, for the in-
stability in the region, [and] for tire 
threats against the United States. Sad-
dam Hussein,s regime was very dan-
gerous." Rice then went on to say, with 
misplaced optimism, that without Hus.. 
sein "the world is a lot safer and the war 
on terrorism is well served" Unfortu-
nately, events in Iraq, notwithstanding 
the repeated ~ of the presi-
dent, support the views of Scowcroft, 
and not.Rice. 
The policy enunciated by Bush the 
elder at the end of Desert Storm has 
been shown to be correct Scowcroft's 
2002 objections to Bush the younger's 
determination to invade Iraq were pre-
scient. It is unfortunate that George W. 
Bush did not choose Scowcroft as na-
tional security adviser, ortllat his views 
were -not seriously considered by the 
current administration. The long-term 
impliCationsoftheadministration'sde-
cision to invade and occupy Iraq unfor-
tunately echo the same problems 
raised by Bush and Scowcroft at the end 
of Desert Storm, and by Scowcroft in 
the Willi Street Journal commentuy. 
The end is not in sight 
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